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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historic-
ity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is an epistemological presupposition of 
Gadamer’s idea of ‘concept history’ (Begriffsgeschichte) violates the 
substance of philosophy considerably, i.e. its problems and conceptual-
ity, because of the limits it sets to the reach of thoughtful consideration 
(Denken). I argue that if philosophy shall be possible as an epistemic 
activity intended for knowledge, a theory which defends the universality 
of thinking must be added to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This paper 
shows how his theory unjustly ignores ‘thoughtful consideration’ as a 
primordial phenomenon of consciousness which is present   on higher 
levels of understanding. After the criticism of Gadamer’s inadequate 
concept of knowledge the paper concludes with a suggestion to rehabil-
itate the classical notion of thoughtful consideration as the substantive 
and permanent presupposition of all philosophy. The paper demon-
strates how the rise of knowledge from Verstehen to Denken on differ-
ent levels of reflection must lead to a rehabilitation of the philosophy of 
subjectivity and of metaphysics and how this epistemological move 
must affect the idea of a ‘destruction of metaphysics’ which Gadamer 
shares with Heidegger. 
 
1. Introduction. Unfolding the argument 
This paper examines the significance of the notion of historicity for philosoph-
ical thought with a critical view to Gadamer’s idea of ‘concept history’ as phi-
losophy. It is argued that the historical criticism of philosophy which Gadamer 
undertakes by tracking philosophical concepts to their historical context and by 
exposing them to the philosophical (Socratic) dialogue, does not finish the job. 
Concept history considered as philosophy leaves philosophy in trouble because 
it does not proceed to make its product a resource for systematical philosophi-
cal reasoning. Firstly, the paper addresses the criticism which Gadamer – by 
means of concept history - directs at the Neo-Kantian attempts to codify the 
problems of philosophy. Secondly, it shows how his criticism is based on his 
theory of the ‘historicity of understanding’ (Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens) pre-





historical character of understanding, it is argued that contrary to Gadamer’s 
view, understanding is not accomplished as knowledge (Erkenntnis) until the 
philosophising subject transcends his historical context by means of thoughtful 
consideration.  
It is my essential point that Gadamer himself is forced to acknowledge the 
role of transcending, conceptual thought. In his own criticism of the idea of 
understanding in traditional hermeneutics, his insistence on the primacy of the 
‘matter at issue’ (die Sache) over the principle of ‘mens auctoris’ involves the level 
of universality as the means of mediating between past and present and thus 
forming a unity in the manifold of historically conditioned interpretations. The 
universal content of the matter at issue presupposes a level of pure concepts as 
thoughts formed by the interpreter. The elevation from the everyday spoken 
language to the level of philosophical conceptuality, from understanding to 
thoughtful consideration, will be demonstrated by the idea of levels of interpre-
tations which I propose. Drawing on the distinction between literary genres 
from figurative, sensitive narratives and poetry to abstract, philosophical ‘robes’ 
of the matter at issue, I substantiate the view that the idea of levels of under-
standing must be integrated in a theory of hermeneutics in order to do justice 
to the epistemic fact that understanding (Verstehen) can become knowledge 
(Erkenntnis). Finally, proposing that philosophy is the genre in which under-
standing of a text culminates in conceptual form, I argue that as regards the so-
called subject-object relation, the intellectual comportment must ascend to the 
level of conceptuality in order to encompass and unite with the historical phe-
nomenon. 
Proceeding with the concepts of ‘universality’ and ‘transcendence’ gained 
through the criticism suggested above, I reestablish the idea of ‘self-aware think-
ing’ from the tradition towards which Gadamer is explicitly critical: the philos-
ophy of subjectivity. I draw on Descartes’ and Kant’s intuition that the experi-
ence of thinking is intimately connected to self-awareness (the ‘cogito’ and the 
‘I think’) and furthermore I show how self-aware thinking is connected to free-
dom and autonomy. I hereby question Gadamer’s refutation of the philosophy 
of subjectivity by suggesting a critique of Heidegger’s idea of a destruction of 





central claim in Gadamer’s theory of concept history that the change of mean-
ing of the word ‘subject’ from substance (hypokeimenon) to ‘subject’ (ego) in mod-
ern philosophy is due to an erroneous development in the use of language. His 
claim is a tacit expression of solidarity to Heidegger’s attempt to go behind 
modern philosophy of consciousness and to substitute an ontology of existence 
in place of the philosophy of consciousness which is the framework of classical 
foundationalism. But Gadamer is inconsistent when on the one side he insists 
on undertaking a historical reflection of the philosophical problems and con-
cepts whereas on the other side he rejects the philosophy of subjectivity which 
is so essential to various branches of modern philosophy. Gadamer’s consent 
to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology trumps his own insistence that historical 
changeability, including due consideration of modern philosophy of conscious-
ness, be an integrate part of philosophical concept history. His denial of the 
modern development which the technical term ‘subject’ has undergone also 
contributes to making the relation between historicity and the status of philo-
sophical reasoning in philosophy ambiguous. 
 
2. Historicity. A piece of ‘concept history’. 
The term historicity in this paper is taken in the sense which Gadamer ascribes 
to it via Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, extended with a historical dimen-
sion from Dilthey among others. The criticism of Hegel at the end of the 19th 
century, for example delivered by, among others, Dilthey, did not just refute 
German Idealism’s notion of a philosophical system. In particular Hegel’s the-
ological-metaphysical doctrine of the history of philosophy was refuted. His-
toricism, which developed on the basis of a criticism of Hegel’s philosophy, 
found in its predominant figure Dilthey a position which relativized philosophy 
to the world view and the age of its originator. Historicism took over Hegel’s 
idea of philosophy as “its age conceived in thoughts” and the idea of the indi-
vidual philosopher as “a child of his time” (Hegel (1955) 16). But its represent-





thoughtful consideration has constituted the basis of philosophy throughout its 
entire history1. 
The feature of historicism which influenced Continental philosophy in the 
20th century is expressed in the term Geschichtlichkeit. Occurring sporadically in 
Hegel but developed systematically into an epistemological category in Dilthey 
(Renthe-Fink (1974) 406) Geschichtlichkeit in general signifies the claim of the 
intrinsically historical character of every human phenomenon. Via a criticism of 
Dilthey’s foundationalist project and drawing on Heidegger’s idea of under-
standing as an essential feature of human existence, Gadamer installed the his-
torical character of the individual as a significant epistemological condition. 
Thus, refuting foundationalism, he turned hermeneutics in another direction by 
ascribing to it the task of exploring the existential-ontological conditions of ex-
perience (Erfahrung). Meaning (Sinn) according to Gadamer is grounded in the 
way the individual person accomplishes his historical being. Historicity means 
cognition on historical conditions. The basic experience of being historical al-
ways happens in the accomplishment of individual existence in a specific his-
torical context2. 
From the perspective of Dilthey’s epistemological project and on the basis 
of Heidegger’s idea of a fundamental ontology, Gadamer developed the idea of 
understanding (Verstehen) based on an analysis of the fundamental structure of 
human existence: temporality in historical sense. Despite his explicit project of 
construing a theory of understanding and meaning (Sinn) on the basis of histor-
ical facticity he unfolded his position in a criticism of classical hermeneutics. It 
would be too much of a detour to treat here the criticism of the scientific ideals 
of objectivity and universality in the humanities brought about by Gadamer3. 
Gadamer denied that he has rejected the idea of a hermeneutic methodology in 
the humanities. He stated clearly that his intention was to go below the level of 
theoretical scientific knowledge exploring how understanding always happens 
 
1 Cf. Hegel (1971) 20; 31-32. Hegel speaks of “the old prejudice” of philosophy: the Platonic dis-
tinction between doxa and episteme which philosophical thought is based on and which the philoso-
pher must bring with him into the study of the history of philosophy.   
2 See Gadamer’s criticism of Dilthey’s epistemology based on this aporia, Gadamer (1975) 205 ff. 
3 Cf. for example Gadamer’s short response to Emilio Betti in Gadamer (1975) “Vorrede zur 2. 





previous to any scientific method. The conditions of pre-scientific understand-
ing are made up by the historical reality of our existence (Gadamer (1975) 261). 
In epistemological respect, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is one among several 
attempts in the phenomenological tradition of the 20th century to lay bare the 
experiences in the lifeworld as a foundation of science or as a sphere of experi-
ences and forms of knowledge independent of science. According to the phe-
nomenological tradition, knowledge acquired in the life-world even demands 
foundational status or primacy due to its originality and presence-to-reality4. In 
this respect Gadamer clearly deviated from classical hermeneutics whose rep-
resentatives, for example Dilthey, attempted to form doctrines of historical 
knowledge by means of scientific method. Instead he insisted on describing the 
structures of understanding as a linguistic phenomenon. The reality of language 
in all human comportment, including communication and interaction, gives ev-
idence of always already acquired experiences. The situation in which under-
standing unfolds lies in continuation of traditions which contain these experi-
ences. Understanding thus happens within historical existence and is accom-
plished on its conditions. Therefore, contrary to Dilthey, Gadamer insisted that 
the primordial experience of historicity cannot constitute universal, ahistorical 
principles of scientific knowledge. 
The shift of meaning which historicity has undergone from Hegel over 
Dilthey via Heidegger5 is thus radical. Historicity ended up signifying an epis-
temic condition which has crucial consequences for the status of philosophical 
hermeneutics as regards its scientific character. The turn has significant conse-
quences for the possibilities and limitations of philosophy. This problem is the 
central issue of this paper and will be treated below. 
 
3. Historicity and understanding. Gadamer’s criticism of traditional hermeneutics. 
The technical term historicity in Gadamer’s philosophy refers to a doctrine of 
understanding which focuses on the comportment of (human) historical 
 
4 An example is Husserl’s Lebenswelt which primarily refers to the dynamic world of perception 
based on senses and corporeality, the socalled kinaesthetical experiences. They make up the founda-
tions of the more abstract, scientific concepts of space, time, matter and movement etc. Other ex-
amples are Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of being-in-the-world and Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenological concept of perception. 





existence as such (Renthe-Fink (1974) 405). The doctrine thus describes the 
hermeneutics of facticity extended to comprise historical being. The experi-
ences made in the practice of everyday life in family, culture and society func-
tion as epistemic conditions of temporal being. If knowledge (Erkenntnis) is 
considered to be understanding (Verstehen) which projects future options (Sein-
können), the experiences acquired through a life practice in continuation of tra-
ditions achieve epistemic status as conditions that are so to speak stored in the 
spoken language. Actually, we rise above the sphere of everyday practice when 
addressing linguistic phenomena in conversations, texts, history, fine arts etc. 
To attain understanding in this higher, linguistic sphere of literature and philos-
ophy means to extend the possibilities of life by virtue of the widening of our 
horizon which happens through the linguistical encounter with unfamiliar his-
torical and cultural life.  
Historical consciousness in hermeneutical respect implies a corrective to 
the presupposition inherent in the methodological ideal of the epistemology of 
Enlightenment. Here foundationalism was based on the presupposition of ep-
istemic self-transparency of subjectivity. By contrast, Gadamer points out that 
historical experiences on which the knowledge of human phenomena is neces-
sarily based depend on the historical situatedness of the subject and have their 
roots in opaque traditions. Moreover, since our existence is always ahead of our 
understanding – we exist before we understand our existence – our attempt at 
epistemological self-transparency can never be final. An epistemological clarifi-
cation of the conditions of understanding in methodological respect is thus a 
futile project. Consequently, hermeneutics must settle with less than traditional 
foundationalism requires. Instead of founding a scientific procedure, a quaestio 
juris, we must be content with a clarification of the quaestio facti, i.e. a description 
of the structure of how understanding happens in historical existence.  
Furthermore, since existence is fundamentally historical and linguistical, 
dialogue and textual interpretation lie at the core of Gadamer’s epistemology. 
His rejection of method enables him to level a criticism at the idea of the her-
meneutical circle as a methodological tool for understanding. Instead of the 
dialectic unfolding between parts and whole of the linguistic object he regards 





at an agreement of the matter at issue (die Sache selbst). Since the dialogue func-
tions as the model of understanding of all human expressions Gadamer clams 
that the object is not primarily some other subjective experience (mens autoris) 
behind the expression. On the contrary, focus must be changed from the object 
to the matter at issue which the partners share and address from different – 
historical or cultural - perspectives. Through this shift Gadamer turns away 
from classical hermeneutics. Inspired by the Platonic dialogue his real interest 
is not so much to understand the ‘mens auctoris’ but the contribution to the 
knowledge of the truth of the matter at issue which the linguistic phenomenon 
expresses. However, it is his final purpose to reveal the experience of historicity 
arising from the encounter with a historically distant phenomenon. Moreover, 
the experience of this radical historicity occurs in the discovery that subject and 
object belong to an encompassing historical movement in which the past is 
mediated with the present exactly in the encounter between past and present. 
This point of focus is Gadamer’s background for his controversial correction 
to classical hermeneutics: The issue of philosophical hermeneutics is not objec-
tivity in the sense of reaching the correct representation of the mens auctoris. By 
contrast, “es genügt zu sagen, daβ man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt 
versteht” (Gadamer (1975) 280). Historicity which is aware of itself as such thus 
amounts to understanding ‘differently’.  
In short, Gadamer’s intention is to show how understanding of all human 
expressions happens on the conditions on historicity and how it primarily ad-
dresses the matter at issue in the overall historical movement through which 
the ‘essence’ of the object is constituted in its changeability. The dialogue with 
human expressions of the past thus opens for the opportunity to make histori-
cal experiences. However, Gadamer’s focus on the hermeneutical experience 
has further aspects. Not only is the object deprived of a permanent meaning 
when the ‘mens auctoris’ is abandoned as the object of understanding. And not 
only does the intention of the author of the linguistic work in the historical 
tradition disappear where interpretations constitute its meaning. The interpreter 
is called to reflect on his own involvement in his age by ascribing to himself the 
projections of meaning – prejudices - caused by the encounter with the histor-





understanding on own conditions he constitutes the mediating link in a “hap-
pening of truth” which is accomplished in the handing over of the object from 
the past to the present. Finally, radical historicity has profound consequences 
for the status of the concept of subjectivity when Gadamer says: “Das Verstehen 
ist selber nicht so sehr als eine Handlung der Subjektivität zu denken, sondern als Einrücken 
in eine Überlieferungsgeschehen, in dem sich Vergangenheit und Gegenwart bestän-
dig vermitteln” (Gadamer (1975) 274-275). 
This is not the place for a critique of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneu-
tics. But it cannot be disputed that his turn from traditional hermeneutics to a 
philosophical hermeneutics of historical experience based on Heidegger’s her-
meneutics of facticity, must be considered to be a further use of hermeneutics 
compared to traditional hermeneutics. Historicity is significant for a study of 
the effective history of historical objects but the experience of being historical 
cannot constitute the essential object of hermeneutics. In fact, with regard to 
scientific and philosophical knowledge, it can be questioned if the ontology of 
facticity constitutes an adequate condition of knowledge at all. Admitted that 
fictive and religious texts which influence our historical life aim at communi-
cating experiences by means of imaginative presentations of existentially rele-
vant situations. But philosophical texts at a higher level of abstraction and uni-
versality presuppose the recipient’s capability of abstract thinking. Already non-
academic, fictive texts need some method of interpretation based on epistemo-
logical conditions. And a further theoretical treatment of the subject matter of 
a text is necessary to for example a (Socratic) dialogue which addresses intellec-
tual issues. The urgent ‘philosophical’ need to raise the level of comportment 
makes it relevant to pose the question of how understanding at a general con-
ceptual level is possible and how it differs from understanding at the level of 
everyday life practice.  
Provided that philosophy is a literary genre based on reasoning by means 
of pure concepts, a problem arises for the hermeneutics of facticity which 
Heidegger and Gadamer want to substitute for traditional epistemology. Histo-
ricity as an epistemic condition becomes a problem for theoretical knowledge. 





history’ should be given its rightful status as a preliminary historical reflection 
of the conceptuality of philosophical problems. 
 
4. Concept history and the basic motive for philosophy 
The fact that historicity becomes a condition of knowledge has the philosoph-
ical implication that ‘concept history’ becomes an integrate part of philosophy6. 
However, on closer inspection the historical approach to the conceptuality (Be-
grifflichkeit) of philosophical problems provides challenges. The claim of the his-
torical character of concepts disputes the pretention to provide the kind of 
knowledge which parts of scientific philosophy7 share with the natural sciences. 
Gadamer even stresses that concept history is not just a preliminary piece of 
work presenting the changes of concepts over time for the sake of developing 
distinct, unambiguous and up-to-date concepts for further use in philosophical 
work. The change which philosophical concepts have undergone through their 
history makes a historical clarification urgent in order to ensure that the con-
ceptual content of the technical terms is the same in theories belonging to dif-
ferent discourses and epochs. History of concepts works by clarifying the phil-
osophical problems by tracing them back to the situations in which they were 
formulated. The revealing of the origin of the concepts makes the conceptual 
differences and their historical development appear. Thus, the clarification of 
concepts through historical reflection is not just the work of pure reasoning. It 
makes concepts historically concrete.  
As mentioned, Gadamer formed his conception of philosophical ‘concept 
history’ in his criticism of the Neo-Kantian conception of history of philosophy 
as Problemgeschichte. More precisely, he reacted to their idea that philosophy con-
sists of a series of relatively permanent problems which various doctrines 
throughout the history of philosophy have tried to solve (Gadamer (1972) 241). 
The Neo-Kantians claimed that the history of philosophy does not display a 
progress towards knowledge in the way that the history of the sciences does, 
but still it demonstrates a development towards ever sharper and clearer aware-
ness of relatively permanent problems. According to Gadamer the idea of 
 
6 See Gadamer (1972) and (1977). 





providing a core of philosophical problems which constitutes the identity of 
philosophy covers up the fact that throughout its history philosophy has been 
motivated by specific historical problem situations. Historical consciousness 
unfolded through historical reflection of concepts must thus refute the presup-
position of an identity beyond historical changeability. Clarification of concepts 
must be accomplished through a history of ideas. Conversely, by cutting off the 
historical origin of philosophical problems, the search for problem identity ends 
up unconsciously accepting a single conceptuality and leaving others out. The 
codification of philosophy is really a “scholastic stiffening” (Gadamer (1972) 
249) which lumps together related problems into a semblance of an identical 
problem. Thematic or systematic philosophy endeavors to achieve scientific 
status by construing a research field consisting of a series of philosophical prob-
lems which can be addressed through scientific method.  
The claim that, unlike the positive sciences, philosophy has no object is 
characteristic of Gadamer’s critique of Neo-Kantianism in particular and phi-
losophy in general. The history of philosophy is a testimony to a gradual loss of 
terrain to the experiential sciences which have taken over epistemic tasks to 
solve by other means than by philosophical method. Philosophy is then left 
with a reduced core of problems, a specific conceptuality and method. Since 
philosophy is denied the access to empirical knowledge, the concepts and prob-
lems of philosophy must be tested on their own history and on the experiences 
of the world as expressed in ordinary language. Here hermeneutical conscious-
ness can set in with a critical investigation consisting of an illumination of the 
historical context of their origin. For example, the central philosophical prob-
lem of free will has arisen from different situations. The Stoic idea of freedom 
as the independence of the heart of any kind of external event is hardly the same 
as Augustine’s idea of free will considered in relation to divine providence. Fur-
thermore, Augustine’s idea of the problem of freedom is hardly identical with 
the modern problem of free will versus determinism. In Augustine’s theologi-
cal-metaphysical context freedom is essentially connected to the concepts of 
good and evil. It concerns the question of man’s capability to rectify the disor-





made oneself unfree by virtue of freedom8 is absent in the modern discussion 
in which necessity is conceived of in terms of natural causality.  
The problem of free will is just one among several examples of how con-
cept history can serve as a conceptual clarification which is not just of historical 
significance. The example gives a clue to understanding how philosophical 
problems have arisen from historical situations or from the need to interpret 
theoretical scientific knowledge within the broader framework of a whole world 
view which includes human action. Other examples are Aristotle who intro-
duced his Metaphysics (prote philosophia) by claiming that philosophical thinking 
arose as a response to the essentially human need to understand the world, a 
need which appears when the basic human needs are satisfied (Aritotle (1982) 
981 b). Conversely, the young Hegel explained the emergence of philosophy as 
a response to the experience of a conflict of an age: the need to reunite or rec-
oncile where the conditions of the age have caused divisions (Hegel (1970) 20 
ff.). According to both, philosophy has always been an urgent matter. Concept 
history is thus grounded in the hermeneutical consciousness of the historicity 
of philosophy. 
 
5. From concept history back to philosophy 
It is fair to say that concept history is one way to confront philosophy with 
‘reality’, viz. its own history in a way that is productive for correcting or varying 
its peculiar conceptuality. The Socratic dialogue is exemplary as a method 
through which current concepts can be exposed to constructive criticism. Thus 
considered, the ‘method’ of the dialogue consists in accomplishing a kind of 
circular movement in which the concept term – the artificial word – is exposed 
to the meaning inherent in the corresponding spoken word of language and 
thus enriched in epistemic respect. Philosophy should take care not to end up 
with a alleged final definition but should instead strive to remain open to the 
experiences contained in the living spoken language. It is in the dialogue or 
conversation in particular that the concept term is negotiated and criticized vis-
á-vis the varying possible meanings of the corresponding word as it is used in 
the spoken language and its peculiar contexts.  
 





Originally, in the Socratic dialogue philosophy was living thought in the 
form of speech, in which linguistic meanings and concept formations were pre-
sented and considered critically. The duty which philosophical conceptuality 
must always pay to the living thought unfolded in the dialogue is evident in the 
‘linguistic need’ (Sprachnot) which philosophy often ends up in because it lacks 
words to express its thoughts adequately. Concepts are artificial products, 
mostly containing clear and distinct contents of meaning in which living 
thought – so to speak – is stiffened in order to become elements of fixed theo-
retical problems. The concept terms must constantly be challenged by being 
played off against the words of the living language of the dialogue. This in order 
to stay near and draw on the experiences from which they are produced and in 
order to ensure the intelligibility of the artificial philosophical concepts.  
It is Gadamer’s point that the speech in which philosophical dialogues are 
unfolded is language in actu, i.e. in intellectual disputes which treat concepts and 
theoretical problems. The artificial language of philosophy must prove its va-
lidity by being exposed to the criticism inherent in the dialogue. This not only 
for the sake of intelligibility but also because the language of the dialogue rep-
resents the everyday language. With its inexhaustible nuances of meaning of 
words everyday language challenges the fixed sense of the concept word. Illus-
trated by Gadamer’s metaphor: similarly to music wherein the overtones are 
part of and extend the sound, the spoken word is accompanied by connotations 
which enrich its meanings. In concept history it is considered productive “daβ 
das philosophische Begriffswort den Zusammenhang mit dem Leben der Spra-
che wahrt und den lebendigen Sprachgebrauch auch in der Verwendung aus-
geprägter Termini dennoch mitklingen lässt” (ibid. 249). 
It is thus clear that Gadamer’s claim that philosophy has no object does 
reduce it to pure formal analyses of language. Philosophy stands in a living re-
lation to the experienced world, i.e. to the understanding of historical life ex-
pressed in the spoken language. Thus to “take on the effort of the concept” in 
philosophical practice is not an admonition to remain within the framework of 
an abstract philosophical system. On the contrary, to think philosophically is to 
take part in the Socratic dialogue, in which fixed concepts are challenged by the 





they express. Furthermore, concept history throws light on philosophical prob-
lems in a backward movement to the context of their origin in historical situa-
tions. But this only in order to open up for experiences productive for a critical 
treatment of the problems. Philosophy does not get any closer to being themat-
ical/systematical than that. Philosophical thought cannot escape the historical 
life on whose changeable foundation it has to unfold.  
 
6. Philosophy, experience and reality 
In the circular movement between the artificial language of philosophy and the 
spoken language of the philosophical dialogue, philosophical thinking opens up 
for the experiences of everyday life ‘stored’ in language. But if philosophy thus 
unfolds as a movement between thinking and linguistic practice, is philosophy 
not limited either to self-criticism and confirmation of everyday language or to 
claiming the authority of the history of ideas at the expense of systematical think-
ing? By contrast, is philosophy not first and foremost oriented towards norma-
tivity? If philosophy is only called to account for its problems and concepts on 
the background of its historical horizon, what becomes of its active, productive 
role of providing knowledge in the normative questions of for example the pos-
sibility of freedom? 
Gadamer considers the approach of philosophy to the world to be medi-
ated through language. Historical reality is basically linguistically structured. 
Language does not depict the world directly; the world appears through lan-
guage. It is “ein Zur-Sprache-kommen, in dem ein ganzes von Sinn sich ansagt” 
(Gadamer (1975) 450). More precisely, in language the world is always already 
represented in a certain way. By learning a language, we experience how a world 
articulates for us. In Gadamer’s words: “Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist 
Sprache” (ibid.). Likewise, perception inheres in a pre-understanding of the ob-
ject perceived, expressed in the scope of sense connected with the use of words 
that signify the perceived object. Only the experience expressed through lan-
guage, i.e. the interpreted world, is available to philosophy for investigation.  
However, Gadamer’s view of language as mediator between thought and 
reality could give rise to the idea that philosophy is incapable of going behind 





everyday language. Regardless of how Gadamer understands the relation be-
tween linguistically mediated experiences and the reality ‘behind’ the object of 
knowledge, it is clear that the clarification of problems through concept history 
implies an encounter of philosophical thinking with the fact of historical exist-
ence. Thus, it is an unfortunate statement by Gadamer that philosophy has no 
object to expose and try its concepts on (Gadamer (1972) 237). It would be 
more precise to say that philosophy shares its object with the sciences but ap-
proaches it differently. Philosophy reflects on the everyday life experiences and 
the scientific knowledge of the world but addresses them at a higher, more gen-
eral level. The problems of philosophy are different from the problems of the 
sciences though they share the same objects. Examples are legion. Thus, the 
problem of free will and determinism arises from a conflict between the intui-
tion of freedom in everyday life practical situations and the naturalistic intuition 
of causality. Both ideas draw on experiences of the world. Philosophy provides 
the framework which explicates the problem of this conflict by treating it on a 
conceptual level. The point is that despite its transcendence of experience in 
approaching the theoretical problem, philosophy’s solution to the problem pro-
vides a knowledge of reality, viz. an important insight into man’s place in the 
world. Pure conceptual thinking is productive as regards knowledge of the 
world!  
Furthermore, philosophical problems would lose their meaning and rele-
vance if the relation to the world is not maintained in theory because then phil-
osophical dialogue would reduce itself to clarification and criticism of concepts. 
To be sure, philosophy owes its virtuality to pure conceptual reasoning but the 
problem of, for example, freedom needs to be ‘spirited’ by the drama of free-
dom as it is played out in existential, social, political and historical situations. 
Conflicts arising in real life force us to reflect at a higher level at which views, 
positions and principles are tested. Thus, concept history is a necessary part of 
philosophy as a conceptual clarification which serves the purpose of determin-
ing the problem. This is important because it reminds us of the umbilical cord 
between philosophy and the world. How to solve the problem depends on 
thoughtful consideration which unfolds around the problem and uses world 





7. Subjectivity – firm foundation or distorting mirror 
If philosophy originates and unfolds as metaphysical problems formed by pure 
thought, the problem of freedom and the idea of subjectivity should rightfully 
be considered the first and maybe also exemplary metaphysical problem. This 
is because the philosophical ideas of self-consciousness and freedom arise 
through the reflection of the capability to think conceptually. In doing philos-
ophy the individual experiences himself differently from the personal character 
of his comportment in everyday life. Hegel’s assertion that the “I” as the gram-
matical subject of a sentence refers both to the universal and the personal self 
(Hegel (1969) 253) expresses this doubling movement of reflection: As a lin-
guistic expression of epistemic self-consciousness the I-saying shows how phi-
losophy arises with a view to two basic themes: the problem of freedom and 
the metaphysics of the self. Below, these two basic themes will be considered 
critically against Gadamer’s thesis of historicity and against the destruction of 
metaphysics which he has taken over from Heidegger. My main argument in-
vokes the elementary fact that the metaphysical questions of self-consciousness 
and freedom are formed on the basis of the simple experience that a reflection 
of the ‘fact of abstract thinking’ leads the individual to the sphere of universality. 
It is my view that Gadamer’s theory of radical historicity unjustly ignores this 
fact and its consequences in the form of the metaphysics which has traditionally 
been based upon that fact. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, it has been a tacitly shared truth 
that thinking means to think for oneself. Regardless of the problem which arises 
with the appearance of the idea of the self, the reference to oneself in the re-
flection on thinking is indubitable. To think is inherently connected to epistemic 
self-consciousness and this fact constitutes both conditions of knowledge and 
the principle of freedom in practical respect. The common statement in ordi-
nary speech “I act” expresses that self-consciousness is intended for freedom: 
The I-subject of the sentence ascribes to itself its reasons for a certain action. 
It claims autonomy9. Subjectivity as a technical term is based on the individual’s 
 
9 The fact that self-conscious thinking de facto does not imply personal self-transparency and con-
sequently ‘thought’ often appears in the deficient form of post-rationalisations of personal interests 






self-discovery as thinking; the mind of the individual appears to itself as both 
receptive, sensing, and as active thinking. Thus, the act of reflection through 
which the mind is divided is the return of the mind to itself whereby the indi-
vidual constitutes itself as a subject opposite an object. The I-subject thus be-
comes an epistemic principle by virtue of its capability to think, i.e. to synthesize 
and distinguish concepts. Naturally philosophical tradition has been concerned 
with the I-subject conceived of as a function of logical operations unlike psy-
chologically based associations formed by psychological self-consciousness. 
The first constitutes the individual as subjectivity, the latter as a person10.  
Because Gadamer consents to Heidegger’s fundamental-ontology and re-
fuses the possibility of transcending historical facticity, he also refutes the con-
ception of an I-subject. For just that reason he consequently denies subjectivity 
as a principle – foundation - of philosophy. All understanding and action are 
accomplished as historical reality. Concept history, according to Gadamer, is a 
way of ‘dismantling’ (Abbauen) the metaphysics of subjectivity by tracking the 
concept to the context of its origin. ‘Self-consciousness’ allegedly does not refer 
to any world-transcending experience. This is because the use of the word sub-
ject (lat. subjectum) as a technical term in philosophy has arisen through a false 
conceptual development: ‘Subject’ which in Descartes signified self-conscious-
ness as an epistemological principle, originally meant the same as substance (lat. 
substantia) which was a translation of the (Greek word) hypokeimenon. However, 
the crucial point in Gadamer is the change of meaning from the foundation of 
being (Seiendes) to the foundation of thought. It was the metaphysical implica-
tion of this change that subject as a term became a model of the idea of the I as 
a substance which exists in modes (lat. modi) of consciousness11. Thus, philosophy 
of consciousness initiated a tradition based on the idea of self-consciousness as 
an independently existing, mental thing (lat. res cogitans). Gadamer’s criticism 
 
self-reflection constitutes the possibility of self-knowledge since it denotes the principle by which 
the self becomes aware of himself. Thus, self-consciousness is intended for practical self-determina-
tion on the basis of conscious motivation, including for example moral principles. The sentence “I 
act” expresses the intention of the subject to commence an act freely. However, in reality there are 
degrees of freedom. 
10 Cf. Kant’s distinction between the transcendental, objective unity of apperception and the subjective 
unity of consciousness in: Kant (1956) 151b; B139 (§18). 





refers to this merging of ontology with philosophy of (self-)consciousness. With 
a view to Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics and his rehabilitation of Greek 
ontology, Gadamer replaced the doctrine of the trans-mundane subjectivity 
from Descartes with Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity.  
However, Gadamer’s claim that the change over time of the meaning of 
the word ‘subject’ should be the cause of the initiation of modern philosophy 
of consciousness is not plausible. Surely, concept history illuminates the devel-
opment of this concept. But a change of linguistic meaning is not enough to 
explain the substantive or real foundation of the change. More likely, it is a basic 
existential experience with roots in late ancient Greek thought that lies behind 
the detachment of the person from the world. The distinction between self-
consciousness and world-consciousness from Socrates to ancient stoicism, 
skepticism and Augustine originates in experiences of what modern philosophy 
calls alienation. In the experience of the breakdown of the moral and political 
order in late ancient Greece, the origination of epistemic self-consciousness was 
due to the individual’s attempt to cope with the conflict between external po-
litical decline and its own inner ‘ethos’ in order to maintain his ethical integrity. 
The experience of being thrown back onto oneself, being alone with one’s own 
conscience in a strange world, became an experience whose echo can still be 
traced in Descartes’ skeptical arguments; in the refuge into the inner world. 
It is remarkable that despite the light which the history of the concept of 
self-consciousness throws on the origination of modern philosophy of con-
sciousness, Gadamer does not recognize any substantial foundation of epis-
temic self-consciousness. He rejects the distinction between self- and world-
consciousness (Gadamer (1972) 244) which marked the birth of modern phi-
losophy: “Der Fokus der Subjektivität ist ein Zerrspiegel”, he states (Gadamer 
(1975) 261). The allegedly false term covers up the historicity of understanding. 
But in the perspective of the historical outline of the experiences of self-con-
sciousness presented above, Gadamer’s use of the hermeneutics of facticity ap-
pears remarkably unfounded. What justifies his rejection of the historically re-
current experiences of alienation as a genuine cause of substantive changes in 
philosophical concepts and problems? One must say that Gadamer’s applica-





understanding which limits the possibilities of philosophical thinking consider-
ably, even in view of what the pre-scientific experiences which Gadamer him-
self invokes gives reason to. When he claims that understanding means “being 
involved in an event of tradition (Überliefering) in which the past and the future 
is mediated” (Gadamer (1975) 274-275), this can only refer to understanding as 
the comportment in everyday life practice. But Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not 
fit for treating the higher conceptual level of knowledge (Erkenntnis) and the 
theoretical problem even though the divide between self and world conscious-
ness is existentially founded. 
 
8. The problem of freedom in the light of hermeneutics 
As suggested above, the concept of freedom is tied to the concept of subjectiv-
ity – self-consciousness – and therefore it must constitute a component in the 
hermeneutics of action. It speaks in favour of the project of a hermeneutics of 
facticity that freedom considered as absence of hindrances to act at one’s own 
will appears abstract and unreal. As soon as the apparently free choice is to be 
effected in a particular action, motivations and reasons from the life of the agent 
appears. One may say that freedom considered as a mode of being reveals a 
continuity of collective life patterns which unite presence, future and past. Con-
crete freedom unfolds as participation in traditions. So far, one can understand 
freedom as an accomplishment of being rather than as a questionable intuition 
of freedom in an isolated moment of choice.  
As practical self-consciousness, historical being is connected to reflection 
and self-understanding. Therefore, freedom becomes an issue. As unfolded 
above, understanding exists in degrees from the knowing-how of comportment 
in everyday life to theoretical knowing. Gadamer’s weighing of the past mode 
of temporality is reductive with respect to human existence which accomplishes 
freely by realising future options. Existence is led with different degrees of con-
sciousness: the more consciousness, the more freedom. However, to Gadamer 
a historical being which is aware of himself as such is predominantly looking 
back. This is partly correct insofar as the agent, by reflecting on the presuppo-
sitions of his act, is thrown onto himself and is bound to choose among the 





the situation cannot be Kant’s ‘causality of freedom’ (Kant (1956) 522 ff. (B560 
ff.)) which is opposed to the causality of nature. Far from being the noumenon 
emerging ‘senkrecht von oben’, freedom appears to the agent in a situation with 
a view to particular conditions and options to the agent. Surely, the individual 
subject is situated but Gadamer seems to overlook the spontaneous activity 
through which the individual makes himself the subject by deciding on actions 
on the basis of consciously made experiences of the historical life. Whereas Gad-
amer weights the passive, ‘thrown’, aspect of the situation12 and underrates the 
subject as the conscious and active aspect, it would be more accurate to empha-
size the latter if the situation of the action is to be understood historically con-
crete, i.e. as constituted by all three temporal modes. Patterns of action – for 
example morals – in the present age which is characterised by an increasing loss 
of traditions or a general loss of commonly shared values are not accidentally 
associated with existential choices13. ‘Existence’ essentially means conscious com-
portment to options of existence under all circumstances. When previously ob-
vious patterns of behavior have become absent, thinking becomes urgent. It 
centers the individual in himself, making him self-aware by challenging him to 
project convictions oriented towards actions for which only he, the agent, can 
be responsible. 
Freedom characterised by the slightly rough expression ‘to act from one-
self’ is not absolute in the Kantian sense. Kant’s idea of a pure, practical reason 
as a deductive principle of moral imperatives is insufficient. By virtue of its 
formal character it cannot be connected with the substantial being of our life 
practice. Nevertheless, it is a fall into the opposite extreme when Gadamer, in 
order to avoid ethical formalism, identifies moral reason with the always already 
functioning rules in family, state and history and when he encourages the agent 
to a self-reflection which situates existence in the “determining substantiality in 
all subjectivity” (Gadamer (1975) 286). Despite the fact that total self-transpar-
ency considered as a complete knowledge of the presuppositions of one’s action 
is unattainable this shortcoming does not violate the ideal of acting from oneself. 
 
12 As a slight corrective of Heidegger’s emphasis on the future aspect of existence he remarks that 
belonging to traditions is just as original as our ‘thrownness’ towards future options of existence 
(Gadamer (1975) 248). 





The choice considered as an independent initiation of a series of events by no 
means presupposes total personal, including psychological, transparency. Gad-
amer’s statement, “Geschichtlichsein heiβt, nie im Sichwissen aufgehen” (Gad-
amer (1975) 285) means that the conditions of action are infinite and confused 
in empirical historical respect. But the ‘horizon’ as Gadamer calls this vague to-
tality of presuppositions is only a problem in historical, sociological and psy-
chological investigations whose task it is to provide causal explanations of be-
havior. By contrast, the action of the individual is autonomous when it is ac-
complished self-consciously, i.e. based on own convictions. 
Freedom in the sense that the agent himself controls the presuppositions 
of his action implies a demand of an understanding of the situation. Here Gad-
amer points to the lack of clarity as a basic feature of the hermeneutic situation. 
We always find ourselves in the middle of it (ibid. 285). But this is not quite 
true. A situation is always determinate. For example, the situation of a family is 
always considered in a certain, determinate respect, e.g. its economic situation. 
The being of a family in general is a vague matter but it can be determined with 
regard to economy etc. The expression often referred to: “to be in a confused 
situation” simply refers to the embarrassment with regard to the options of a 
certain situation. But apart from being ‘thrown’ into a situation, the understand-
ing comportment always also stands out as an active response in the form of a 
decision from conscious considerations. The individual constitutes himself as a 
subject simply by intervening in the course of events to consciously change the 
conditions of his life. Thus, epistemic self-transparency in the sense of clarity 
of the general convictions laid at the basis of the action must be considered 
principal with regard to the specific situation. The reasons for the action include 
both an appropriate understanding of the particular situation and the conviction 
from which we choose to determine the action. Thus, surely the totality of his-
torical presuppositions of an action is unclear. But this is irrelevant since the 
action is determined by the purpose, i.e. by the object which we choose to re-
alise. How we gather and use our historical presuppositions in the situation is 
decisive. In the account of the principles which a moral agent has drawn from 
experiences, the clear totality of presuppositions or causes appears as the suffi-





presence-to-the-agent of the understanding of the situation and of the princi-
ples which the subject has chosen to act from. 
Gadamer correctly remarks that we understand ourselves “in a natural way 
in the family, in the society, in the state, we live in” long before we reflect on 
ourselves (Gadamer (1975) 261). But conscious life is not being, purely and simply, 
it is constituted by the spontaneous arising of self-consciousness, for example 
occasioned by existential experiences of alienation. It arises by presenting to the 
individual a demand to critically appropriate the traditions which he has hitherto 
taken part in unconsciously and by working out own standards for the conduct 
of life. To extract experiences from life practice and transform them into mo-
tives for action is the individual’s own achievement, his due and responsibility. 
Thus self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung) is not a “fluttering in the closed circuits of 
the historical life”, as Gadamer claims (ibid.). It is the individual’s self-reflection 
as being the subject of his conduct of life. ‘Subjectivity’ does not signify the 
historical being of the individual pure and simple. More likely, the technical 
term expresses the dignity which the individual qualifies for when in critical 
reflection he suspends current moral precepts and insists on acting on the basis 
of own convictions. It signifies the authority of taking over the situation, mak-
ing it one’s own responsibility instead of just considering oneself thrown into 
confused situations. However, autonomy in this sense presupposes the idea of 
degrees of consciousness in situations in which the beginning of conscious life must 
be made. 
 
9. From understanding in everyday life to metaphysical knowledge 
As suggested above, a crucial presupposition of Wahrheit und Methode is the ‘de-
struction’ of the concept of the subject as self-consciousness, the principle pre-
dominant in foundationalism from the beginning of the modern age14. It is an 
implicit project of Heidegger’s ontology to bring the Cartesian ‘ego cogito’ back 
to the lifeworld from which it detached when through reflection it established 
itself as self-consciousness. Accordingly, Gadamer replaces self-consciousness 
as a principle of philosophy with the individual’s comportment of his being. He 
shows how understanding in the forms of the encounter with the other – a text 
 





or person - is historical because tradition manifests in the form of prejudices as 
conditions of understanding. But it could be objected that the historical horizon 
which the individual thus carries with him in everyday life only has exclusive 
validity as a condition of understanding in just that everyday practice. In this 
sphere the individual unfolds competences (ein Seinkönnen) of linguistic, cultural 
and moral character by drawing on traditions which defy every epistemological 
attempt to establish total foundational transparency. The term ‘horizon’ is Gad-
amer’s well-chosen metaphor to signify the quintessence of the experiential 
conditions of understanding. But the metaphor has limitations as regards the 
individual considered as the subject of cognition in the above analysed sense. 
The peculiar reflection of the historical experiences relevant to a situation is an 
appropriation undertaken by the individual subject which implies a formation 
of concepts which can connect the past with the present situation and thus 
secure the temporal continuity of the individual’s being. The individual exists 
in openness towards a future horizon; as subject he therefore consciously con-
siders reasons for his actions in order to be able to initiate a new series of events. 
Subjectivity signifies this beginning anew and this is exactly what qualifies his ac-
tion as free. 
Considered in relation to an action in which freedom arises through the 
reflection of the historical, the idea of a historical horizon of understanding is 
epistemologically insufficient because it is unthematised and vague. The raising 
of consciousness effected by the subject when it transforms its unthematised 
experiences into knowledge and forms moral principles, signifies an elevation 
from the straightforwardness of everyday life practice to a level of reflection on 
which metaphysical problems and concepts are formed, for example the con-
ception of the self and the problem of freedom. Gadamer’s concept history is 
incomplete because it only tracks philosophical concepts and problems back to 
the linguistic practice of everyday life and to the philosophical dialogue in which 
they are criticised. His thinking does not continue from concept history and 
critical dialogue back again to the level of metaphysics where the problems are 
treated systematically. In fact, it is doubtful whether concept history does justice 
to philosophy at all. Surely, the philosophical dialogue which makes up the fo-





challenged by the abundance of meaning which their corresponding words in 
living speech contain, is a necessary challenge to the problems of disputes which 
otherwise would tend to stiffen in academic codifications. Thus, concept his-
tory is not just legitimate but necessary. However, instead of using concept his-
tory constructively as a method to provide adequate concepts for systematical 
philosophy Gadamer stops half-way. Concept history is supposed to perpetu-
ally play off current philosophical concepts against linguistic meanings in the 
living dialogue. But it relativises the concepts to their historical context without 
suggesting constructive options for systematic philosophy. 
With regard to the ideal inherent in the striving of philosophy towards 
knowledge, Gadamer’s concept history does not exhaust the possibilities of phi-
losophy. As argued above, philosophical hermeneutics, whose rationality his 
idea of concept history is based on, does not do justice to metaphysics, e.g. to 
the problem of freedom. Concept history cannot cope with knowledge of a more 
general character. The problem of freedom is exemplary to justifying the current 
interest of metaphysics: Metaphysics takes over where physics stops; it inte-
grates empirical knowledge into the context of the general problems of meta-
physics. And these problems are concrete in their own way, for example as re-
gards the question of the possibility of freedom in a world determined by nat-
ural laws. Gadamer’s hermeneutics leads to a criticism of metaphysics because 
philosophical hermeneutics is founded on the claim of radical historicity. But the 
refutation of the conception of philosophical reason predominant in the whole 
of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel15 is too hasty. It ignores pos-
sibilities of knowledge. And the elevation from the experience in everyday life 
practice to the level of theoretical frameworks, including metaphysics, does not 
necessarily imply that life practical and existential questions are ignored. 
Though treated by intellectual means, the theoretical problems of metaphysics, 
including the problem of freedom, are of high importance for the attitude to 
the world both as knowledge and conditions for practical purposes. 
In defense of Gadamer’s reservations about metaphysics it can be pointed 
out that the aim of his theory of understanding is to discuss methodological 
problems with traditional hermeneutics. But in fact, this discussion is just an 
 





offshoot of his predominant attempt to analyse meaning (Sinn) in terms of the 
understanding comportment in the historical reality of existence. However, it 
cannot be ignored that Gadamer unfolds his conception of historicity as a prin-
ciple of understanding in an explicit criticism of traditional hermeneutics, espe-
cially with regard to its ideals of method and objectivity. The very idea of a 
concept history considered as philosophy (Gadamer (1972)) is a clear attack on 
the scientific virtues of objectivity and universality which lay at the foundation 
of science and metaphysics. The criticism of what he calls “stiffened scholastic 
problems” (ibid. 249) in philosophy16 together with his insistence that philo-
sophical conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit) be tracked to linguistic practice does not 
just aim at injecting more life and existential significance to philosophy. In fact, 
it reduces the purpose of philosophy. Instead of striving for knowledge, philos-
ophy should throw light on the historical situations in which philosophical think-
ing arises. Gadamer transfers to philosophy the intention from his philosophi-
cal hermeneutics: to investigate what it means to learn by experience. As a conse-
quence, experiences of conceptual diversity and change through concept history 
are more interesting to him than the attempt to use concept history as a prelim-
inary enterprise to provide adequate concepts for genuine philosophical reason-
ing. Concept history is a way for him to clarify the very concept of historicity, 
not to qualify the systematic treatment of philosophical problems. 
Despite Gadamer’s reservations about the scientific status of the human-
ities, he does not escape the key scientific ideas of conceptuality and universality 
in his philosophical hermeneutics. One could object that despite the fact that 
understanding is permeated by historical context, both as regards the individual 
subject and the object, the idea of the general (das Allgemeine) still plays a signif-
icant role in the historical mediation between past and present in which under-
standing happens. In the encounter of the subject with the object, when the 
textual understanding passes over into an orientation towards the ‘matter at 
issue’ (die Sache), this latter must be explicated in terms of general, here philo-
sophical, concepts (Gadamer (1975) 253). Consequently, a conception of the 
matter at issue which can function as a key to the interpretation of the text in 
 
16 Gadamer refers to the Neokantian project of formulating a problem history (Problemgeschichte), see 





its various historical interpretations must be worked out. Here the interpreter 
must proceed in the same way as in related types of cognition: Just as in the 
common relation of cognition the subject must compare, abstract and synthe-
size empirical matter, i.e. form a concept in order to grasp the same in the man-
ifold, the interpreter has to find in the historical phenomenon that which is 
similar to the well-known and familiar from his own context of experience. The 
hermeneutical, circular movement between prejudice as projection (Entwurf) 
and the answer of the text happens as an interplay which aims at completing a 
correspondence between different perspectives on the matter at issue. How-
ever, Gadamer’s term ‘fusion of horizons’ (Horizontverschmelzung) which refers 
to this correspondence cannot hide the fact that it is the understanding of the 
matter at issue that mediates between the different ‘positions’ of the interpreter 
and the text, and that only in conceptuality the matter at issue is actualized and 
functions as the permanent basis, the common denominator, which connects 
and transcends the historically specific interpretations. Without the conceptual 
content, which is the product of thought, the related phenomena (interpreta-
tions) remain historically separate. Consequently, understanding as a process 
would remain unfocused and blurred. 
Gadamer himself stresses the significance of the ‘matter at issue’. The phil-
osophical character of his hermeneutics shows in his rejection of the mens auctoris 
as the primary object of understanding. The displacement from the (intention 
behind the) text to the general ‘matter at issue’ is motivated by the reader’s own 
concern with the matter at issue. To understand somebody means to understand 
what he is saying. But from the experience of the otherness in the way the text 
addresses the matter at issue, its perspective on it, the reader can only appropri-
ate the ‘mens auctoris’ on the general level by means of conceptual thinking. 
Furthermore, if understanding is accomplished via this general level, subjectiv-
ity becomes central: Since the general matter at issue connects the reader with 
the text of the past, then thoughtful consideration (Denken), whose object is 
exactly the unifying universal, must be the highest condition of understanding17. 
In addition, the individual constitutes himself as subject exactly by thinking the 
 
17 According to Gadamer the orientation towards the truth is primary and only the disagreement 
with the interlocutor makes him, the ‘mens auctoris’, the object of understanding as a result of the 





universal content. Thus, understanding proceeds by aiming at a conceptual un-
derstanding of the universal because only this latter can unite the reader with 
the text allowing him to see it as a perspective, different from his own, on the 
same object. Understanding which has to grasp different interpretations of the 
same matter while avoiding being confused by the abundance of empirical mat-
ter cannot succeed without abstract, conceptual thinking which exactly extracts 
and adheres to the universal in the manifold. 
The point is that thinking which arises spontaneously as the activity of the 
subject when the identical matter at issue is to be extracted from the material, 
is connected with self-consciousness. As unfolded above, it is by virtue of think-
ing that consciousness centers in itself and makes itself subject. The reflection 
(Besinnung) through which the individual calls himself to account for the truth 
of the matter at issue in a dialogue with the text, must proceed by producing 
the conceptuality on the level of thought. Furthermore, since the matter at issue 
only appears through the appropriation by thinking, the individual discovers himself 
as subject just as he mediates the historical past with his own present time. Thus, there is a 
connection between the accomplishment of understanding in knowing the mat-
ter at issue and consciousness returning to itself. Self-consciousness constituted 
by thinking plays a central role in the accomplishment of higher level (concep-
tual) forms of understanding.   
A crucial element in Gadamer’s theory of the historicity of understanding 
is his rehabilitation of application as a part of hermeneutics. This in order to ‘de-
stroy’ the idea of the matter at issue conceived as an universal – Platonic - entity 
beyond its historical appearance. Whether or not Gadamer is right in claiming 
that understanding is accomplished through application in the sense of appro-
priation on the historical conditions of the individual; i.e. even if the metaphysical 
hypostasis of the identity of the matter at issue across time really is only an 
abstraction, it cannot be denied that the conceptual explication of the matter at 
issue, just by involving concepts, transcends the historical robes epistemically. 
And as argued above, understanding must stick to the identical notion or prob-
lem in the manifold of temporally distinct views in different epochs. This means 
that subjectivity does not so much imply detachment from the world which in-





which the individual must establish to himself when he thinks the universal and 
transcends the mere particular in order to grasp the identical in the manifold; 
all this as a way of accomplishing consciously his historical being. The conceptual expli-
cation of the matter at issue is thus tied to the emergence of the individual as 
self-consciousness.  
In order to avoid metaphysical implications of the concept of the matter 
at issue, Gadamer draws on the criticism, to which Aristotle exposed Plato’s 
notion of the good when he rejected it as an empty universal idea (Gadamer 
(1975) 295 ff.). By considering the idea of the good in relation to the human 
ethical striving, Aristotle transferred Plato’s ethics from the sphere of eternal 
knowledge to the practical field of virtuous striving. Ethics, according to Aris-
totle, is not theoretical knowledge (episteme) but a practical competence (phrone-
sis). Acquired through endeavour and cultivation, the good is practical 
knowledge of how to act differently in different situations to accomplish the 
same. It is Gadamer’s point that situating the good in existence as the appro-
priate action in the specific situation only means a renunciation of the illusion 
of a metaphysical transcendence of the temporal sphere. By contrast, the gain 
is that focus on action and endeavour instead of theoretical knowledge involves 
the individual existentially. Knowing the good means to become good. Virtue 
is tied to being. 
From the ethics of Aristotle, Gadamer extracts the hermeneutical point18 
that the connection of knowledge to action in the situation (phronesis) means 
that virtue consists in knowing how to do and become good. This has prepared 
the way for legal and theological hermeneutics in which application was previ-
ously a substantial part of each doctrine: Understanding of the doctrine means 
to know how the doctrine is made obliging for practice: Understanding a legal 
text is to know how its “legal validity is made concrete” (ibid. 292). Correspond-
ingly, the theological doctrine must be understood from the perspective of the 
preaching, which aims at salvation. Dogmatics without application remains a 
torso. 
Gadamer wants to arrive at a hermeneutics which ties understanding to 
the temporality of existence. His rehabilitation of application as an integrate 
 





moment of understanding is significant here because via Aristotle’s criticism of 
Plato it contains a criticism of intellectualism, i.e. of the classical idea of the 
ahistorical character of knowing. The intelligibility of reason by virtue of which 
consciousness rises to establish itself as a transmundane subject, is the Platonic 
inheritance in modern philosophy which Gadamer wants to stamp out by situ-
ating reason historically. Reason amounts to clarification of human existence 
and to successful interpretations. The meaning of the text shared by the reader 
and his text is only actual – genuine – in historically concrete interpretations. 
But Gadamer makes it too easy for himself. His criticism presupposes that 
understanding – and knowledge in general – can be adequately explained within 
the ontological framework set by Heidegger. Precisely because he unfolds his 
concept of understanding within the ‘hermeneutics of facticity”, extended to 
encompass language and history, he ignores the real epistemic conditions. As 
demonstrated above, a simple reflection on what happens when we understand 
blows up the framework of his ontological idea of understanding as a historical 
accomplishment of being (ibid. 274-275). By contrast, appropriation – the intel-
lectual activity of making a content of knowledge one’s own – expresses that 
understanding which proceeds linguistically and conceptually constitutes the ac-
tivity through which the individual determines himself as a subject when making 
the matter at issue his own through thought. One can only think for oneself, 
and what one thinks belongs to oneself. However, Gadamer sticks to the pre-
supposition taken over from Heidegger that the historical change of the mean-
ing of the term ‘subject’ from ontological foundation (hypokeimenon) to the men-
tal object of self-consciousness is an erroneous linguistic development. But be-
cause he wants to banish the philosophical idea of self-consciousness and its 
metaphysics from philosophy, he banishes abstract thinking too. Consequently, 
his theory is blind to the fact that there are levels of understanding which are 
relevant not just to hermeneutics but also to metaphysics.   
 
10. Hermeneutical and philosophical understanding of the ‘matter at issue’. On levels of in-
terpretation 
If levels of understanding are considered to be an element in hermeneutics, it 





hermeneutic spiral than by a circle. The form of the activity performed by the 
subject changes as understanding becomes more thematically oriented and re-
lated to general problems arrived at by abstraction. As is well known, herme-
neutics considered as an art of interpretation is based on the presupposition 
that understanding is not accomplished just by reading or listening to written 
or spoken words. A linguistic expression needs an interpretation guided by a 
method which the interpreter controls. However, Gadamer’s focus on pre-the-
oretical understanding as a mode of existence reveals that linguistic practice and 
traditions are in play as conditions prior to any methodically controlled process. 
Phenomenological analysis shows that the encounter with the object aims at 
completing understanding as the correspondence between the different per-
spectives of the interlocutors. Their horizons merge into a mutual understand-
ing of the shared matter at issue (die Sache). As regards the interpretation of fine 
art, for example poetry, Gadamer speaks of a double mimesis as a correspondence 
which unites the interpreter with the object. The first must imitate what the 
second did: “der Dichter stellt dar und der Spieler stellt dar. Aber gerade diese 
doppelte Mimesis ist eine: was in der einen und in der anderen zum Dasein 
kommt, ist das gleiche” (ibid. 112). For example, the playing of a piece of music 
is called interpretation because the performance by the pianist merges with the 
composer’s presentation. Similarly, the hermeneutical art of understanding con-
sists in bringing oneself to oscillate in accord with the text by presenting the 
original presentation of the matter at issue which both share as their common 
object. 
The variety of presentations and interpretations is due to the connection 
of the work to different historical contexts in which its matter at issue so to 
speak is actual in ways which are productive for how later times understand that 
piece of work. But though this ‘effective history’ (Wirkungsgeschichte) of the art-
work constitutes the condition of understanding, a distinction must be made 
between, on the one hand, the hidden work of effective history hidden from 
the interpreter and, on the other hand, the explicit conceptual form which this 
work receives when the interpreter face to face with the object and through the 
process of understanding crystallizes the philosophical matter at issue. In other 





understanding depending on how conscious or intellectual the understanding 
is. But there are also levels of understanding in another sense. An example is 
the difference between the figurative and narrative form of imaginative litera-
ture and the interpretation on a conceptual level. A poem or a tale can have the 
same object as a philosophical text, the former illustrating the latter’s notion, 
and the latter explaining the matter at issue of the former. The difference be-
tween literary genres testifies of different epistemic forms or levels of commu-
nication and appropriation. Understanding has a different character depending 
on the genre or the level on which the matter at issue is addressed. One thing 
is the weekly magazine which is supposed to draw on immediately recognizable 
sensual emotions in the reader. Another thing is the conceptually mediated ex-
perience of theoretical problems and reasoning of a philosophical text19. The 
fulfillment which accompanies knowledge produced by active thinking is a pos-
itive experience of another kind than the feeling of satisfaction evoked in some 
people through the reading of a trivial love story. Both experiences are tied to 
emotions, but the former is tied to an intellectual matter whereas the latter to 
sensuality and the personal life of the reader. Different genres, from popular 
literature to religious and philosophical texts, probably exhibit structurally related 
processes of understanding, for example the pattern of the hermeneutical circle. 
But different genres also express different forms and levels of understanding 
and degrees of universality.  
The distinction between the general structure of all interpretations and levels 
of understanding implies that the elements in philosophical hermeneutics, in-
cluding circularity, prejudice, application, effective history etc., are necessary but 
not sufficient features to describe how understanding develops. It is also nec-
essary to throw light on levels extending from understanding – Verstehen – to 
knowledge – Erkenntnis. This not only to do justice to the specific differences 
of genres, for example the peculiarity of philosophical knowledge, but also be-
cause other fictional, literary texts can be interpreted on different levels and 
depths of understanding, depending on the explication of these levels. For ex-
ample, the quality of Hamlet is due to the complexity of the matter at issue and 
 
19 Mythology is of a certain difficult kind since it expresses a religious experience and knowledge 





how the play vividly unfolds a universal human problem: as a presentation of a 
world out of order and the revenge or the restoration of the world order in the 
hands of a hesitating young man, the play entertains by playing directly on a 
gamut of down-to-earth – ‘simple’ – and well-known experiences of injustice, 
dissimulation, loneliness, love, anger, jealousy and hatred. But the play also sub-
tly and generally deals with “the poison that spreads”, with the evil that seeps 
into even the most honest person and destroys his closest relations. It deals 
with situations such as standing up against injustice but also with experiences 
of being destroyed by oneself through the destructive behaviour of revenge 
when out of control it is directed against even the dear ones. Goethe’s lapidary 
formulation that all of Shakepeare’s plays aimed at determining the point “in 
dem das eigentümliche unsres Ichs, die prätendierte Freiheit unsres Wollens, 
mit dem notwendigen Gang des Ganzen zusammenstöβt” (Goethe (1978) 226) 
contains both a universal and precise character which may not only embrace 
Shakespeare but also include the essence of Greek tragedy: The punishment of 
King Oedipus was the result of lack of knowledge of - or lack of will to see - the 
greater whole of life and fate. But on the throne of power Oedipus is over-
whelmed by misfortunes and suddenly he understands himself and his deeds 
from the perspective of the greater whole of life thereby realising the guilt he 
has incurred.  
Furthermore, by virtue of its universal significance the problem of guilt 
sets the scene for another illumination in the context of the history of ideas. It 
is possible to relate the ancient idea of fate and guilt to the Christian narrative 
of the Fall of Man. In the latter, freedom marks the deed through which the 
individual person establishes a relation to himself through a break with the di-
vine order. The problem across epochs deals with the conflict between freedom 
and the world order. This matter at issue (die Sache) at its most general level 
signifies different forms of spirit: ancient and modern. Thus, the general perspec-
tive arrived at through the philosophical rise to the level of the universal does 
not lead into abstractions. On the contrary: thoughtful consideration grasps no-
tions (Ideen) that are active as essential powers forming human mind through 
history. Philosophy as distinct from fictional and religious genres insists that 





philosophy. Therefore, philosophy is hermeneutically significant because 
thoughtful consideration is necessary in order to establish the universal level on 
which the matter at issue becomes clear. It follows from this that philosophy is 
not just a genre among others; it constitutes an exemplary level of understand-
ing both as regards form and content. 
 
11. Historically concrete facticity and the transition from concept history to philosophy. 
As argued in this paper the special position which philosophy occupies among 
the humanities presents a problem to philosophical hermeneutics. As concep-
tual thought philosophy challenges the presupposition held by philosophical 
hermeneutics that understanding can be explained within the theoretical frame-
work of the ontology of historical facticity. By contrast, the process of under-
standing implies that the subject raises the conditions of understanding in terms 
of tradition to gradually become aware through reflection. This point appears 
most clearly in the philosophical problem of freedom. The subject focuses on 
his own and on collective experiences relevant to the situation and forms prin-
ciples for action at a conceptual level. Through this active appropriation moti-
vated by practical interest, the recollective movement towards tradition is re-
placed by the opposite movement of a direction toward future existential pos-
sibilities. The individual constitutes himself as a subject at the very moment he 
makes himself the starting point for a determination of his future condition. The 
point is that only thoughtful consideration (das Denken) can mediate between 
the past – traditions already in play - and the indeterminate future. And by virtue 
of thoughtful consideration, the individual discovers himself as subject and in-
itiator of future actions. This means that thoughtful consideration accomplishes 
a turn in the individual being from the passive being thrown to the act of be-
coming himself just as this subject. Thought implies self-consciousness, the 
constitution of subjectivity and consequently freedom. 
Interestingly enough, by undertaking his so-called ‘destruction’ of the sub-
ject through concept history, Gadamer not only presents a change of the mean-
ing of the term ‘subject’. He also takes a critical stance towards what he consid-
ers an illegitimate initiation of the tradition philosophia prima as philosophy of 





allegedly erroneous conceptual development of a philosophical term should be 
able to initiate a whole new tradition in philosophy by construing a – allegedly 
– fictitious field of research: the philosophy of subjectivity. Apart from the de-
monstrable fact that the Cartesian separation of self-consciousness from world-
consciousness has historical roots in existential experiences of alienation in late 
Antiquity, philosophical theories of self-consciousness constitute a whole mod-
ern tradition. Furthermore, concepts of freedom, autonomy, human rights, and 
existentialism presupposes the idea of subjectivity. Admittedly, some theories 
of self-consciousness are encumbered with aporias, for example the theory of 
reflection. Nevertheless, it speaks to the solidity of this problem field that the 
“I” as self-reference in language is phenomenologically connected with the orig-
inal evidence of a fundamental and seminal character so that self-consciousness 
as a basic fact in all human comportment must give rise to an urgent philosoph-
ical question despite the theoretical difficulties in explaining it. 
It is worth noticing that the modern discussion of theories of (self-)con-
sciousness20 can give rise to at least one serious objection to Gadamer’s refuta-
tion of the modern philosophy of subjectivity: he ignores the non-egological 
positions many of which precisely expose a criticism of the ‘objectification’ of 
consciousness, although by other theoretical means than Gadamer uses. Al-
ready Fichte realised the problem connected to self-consciousness as a principle 
of philosophy. His criticism that the utterance “I” in sentences is an expression 
of a reflective act through which the individual constitutes himself as a subject 
vis-á-vis an object consists in his observation that reflective self-consciousness 
does not ‘catch’ the original, pre-reflective absolute, i.e. free, I-subject21 as it 
intends to. The inevitable ‘delay’ which characterises the reflective mode shows 
the theoretical difficulties pertaining to the model of reflection. Still, Fichte 
never abandoned self-consciousness as a philosophical theme because he real-
ised the fundamental significance of the problem. In the light of precisely the 
non-egological wing in this tradition, one can point to a misrepresentation in 
the criticism proposed by Gadamer by means of concept history. Deeply rooted 
in Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological project, he ignores the many attempts 
 
20 See e.g. Frank (1991) and Gloy (1998) for combined historical and systematical presentations and 
discussions of self-consciousness as a philosophical theme. 





to defend a concept of self-consciousness which does not imply the illusion of 
a consciousness-thing. 
Briefly summarized, it has been the aim of this paper to undertake a critical 
examination of the epistemology of radical historicity in philosophical herme-
neutics. The more or less explicit thesis can be summed up as follows: Gada-
mer’s theory of understanding developed on the basis of an analysis of histori-
cally concrete facticity (Wahrheit und Methode) does not do justice to philosophy 
which works on the basis of ‘thoughtful consideration’ (Denken). Considered 
from the side of the former, philosophical hermeneutics founds understanding 
in the comportment of historically situated (human) existence and this puts the 
universality pertaining to philosophical concepts and reasoning into question. I 
have argued that Gadamer apparently does not see that his insistence on the 
epistemological priority of the matter at issue (die Sache) at the expense of the 
‘mens auctoris’ involves universality as the conceptuality which mediates be-
tween the historically conditioned, different ‘robes’ of specific interpretations 
of the matter at issue. ‘Universal thinking’ is implied both in this mediation and 
in the presupposition of the notion of ‘levels of understanding’ which I have 
presented here.  
In continuation, I have investigated the significance of the transformation 
or elevation which the epistemic relation undergoes when moving from the un-
thematized, historical horizon of understanding in everyday life to a thematized, 
conceptual thinking. Gadamer does not address the idea of degrees of under-
standing, probably because it presupposes the possibility of a centering of con-
sciousness in itself, i.e. the individual constituting itself as subject. On the other 
hand, through philosophical concept history, Gadamer attempts to found the 
problems of philosophy - codified philosophy - in the vivid language of the 
dialogue or conversation. Through concept history he differentiates the philo-
sophical problems by tracking them to their urgent historical contexts. Lan-
guage predominantly in the form of conversation must in a Socratic manner 
mediate between thematic philosophy and the experiences of everyday life as 
the technical terms (Begriffsworte) are played critically off against their corre-
sponding words of ordinary language (Sprachworte). In this context, Gadamer’s 





(Gadamer (1975) xxii; 450) could mean that vivid language in the conversation 
is the ‘location’ at which philosophy is called to account for the world interpre-
tation inherent in its conceptuality.  
Despite the fact that concept history can – and should – function as a 
safeguard against the tendency in philosophy to become dogmatic, for example 
in attempts to codify philosophy into a set of permanent problems, it may be 
an impossible task to unite the two above mentioned sides: Gadamer’s theory 
of historically situated understanding and the move from concept history to 
philosophy; understanding considered basically as an accomplishment of histori-
cal being – a knowing how – and theoretical knowledge provided by means of 
conceptual products of thoughtful consideration. Gadamer regards “philoso-
phy as concept history”. He thereby ignores the evident historical documenta-
tion that traditional metaphysics has always addressed urgent real-world prob-
lems, including experiences of alienation as a recurring historical cause of the 
problem of freedom. Arising from conflicts of experiences and attitudes in the 
historical life, the urgent problems relevant to philosophy are perhaps addressed 
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